Cogito et scio invicem . . .

Goethe the Scientist :   Translation and Commentary on Goethe's Der Versuch als Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt 

                By Marilynn Stark   

 Page opened January 23, 2005

Introduction:     

     If the highest science is metaphysics, and all other sciences are subsumed under the truth and method of that metaphysics, then to explore the science of Goethe should be a great undertaking.  While studying science with gifted scientists and a profound mentor at Columbia University, my perception of science was sharpened by mulling over the metaphysics of Goethe through the reading of Faust.  Upon seeing much more recently the list of scientific works by the same literary giant who had uplifted me through the mode of literary art, the fascination I held for Goethe  called me to see further what might be there.  I happened upon the work I wish to translate and present here, Der Versuch als Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt, and immediately saw that same brilliance I knew of Goethe shine forth in his words and concepts, now, however, in the field of science.  With the allowance of some time I should like to present the work of this luminary here, and hope that others who read it and reflect upon it will learn from it.  In all honesty, I have still much to learn of Goethe, and will embark upon this page with a certain humility.  The thinking of Goethe had affected the thinking of mankind over two centuries ago, as he instructed regarding this kernel of truth: that development is critical in all considerations of things and the truths of things.  Having registered that fact of Goethe's contribution when I first became acquainted with him as a dramatist and poet, little did I know at the time the depth of his mind was that of a scientific thinker, as well.  I was therefore most grateful to have seen Der Versuch al Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt as I began to read further into his scientific discoveries and contribution.  The rest will speak for itself as the work unfolds for your perusal and careful apprising.       

     It must be observed for didactic purpose here, that the intellect of Goethe was of the sharpness requisite to the universalization of his perceptive abilities from one field of endeavor to another.  As his understanding of the individual was expressed in his literary accomplishments, so were his precepts of development enshrouding the world view he could so masterfully characterize in a given dramatic character, for example.  The unifying feature of perceiving reality as a one reality whose course for a living entity is to be considered as a balance between what is now and what is to be destiny, as derived from a belief or faith that in the creation there is a preserving principle; and this whether as applied in and through objective scientific observation, or as discerned by a living person in a subjective worldview. Further, perceiving the source of unifying truth in that reality as axiomatically universal itself: these metaphysical tenets of truth infused the thought ventures of Goethe in all of his undertakings with its concurring principle of development as common to all of such unification.  For example, the abstractly fine difference between considering plants in the pluralistic sense for their similarity to all other plants, and in considering instead the single plant for its individual organs in their abilities to metamorhpose, led Goethe to formulate a botanical philosophy based then again on his insight of an individual being living in a mode of development.  The essay Goethe wrote, Metamophose der Pflanzen, is the best known of his scientific endeavors, and is considered to be specially exemplary of Goethe's scientific method.  The exact translation by myself of this scientific work can be found at Starkliteraria on the page 'On Goethe'.  It should prove useful to translate and hence analyze the essay on scientific truth and method as embodied in Der Versuch als Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt herein, while embarking on a deeper understanding of the growth of scientific theory and knowledge in the instance of the botanical insights and contributions of Goethe as a case in point through such a succinct translation of Metamorphose der Pflanzen.  The goal in combining these two essays of Goethe should be for deeper, precise consideration of his scientific work.   

Marilynn Stark   January 23, 2005   © 2005  All rights reserved.  Revised June 1, 2005.

DER VERSUCH ALS VERMITTLER VON OBJEKT UND SUBJEKT         

THE EXPERIMENT AS MEDIATOR OF OBJECT AND SUBJECT

Von Goethe

By Goethe

Translated and with Commentary by Marilynn Stark

New...recitation of Goethe in German is a new project for this Web page which is now underway.

     Preview of the recitation of this scientific writing is now available here.  The user must use QuickTime media player in order to listen.  The project at hand is to include all of the paragraphs in German first, and then also my English translation of each paragraph.  

 (1) Sobald der Mensch die Gegenstände um sich her gewahr wird, betrachtet er sie in bezug auf sich selbst, und mit Recht. Denn es hängt sein ganzes Schicksal davon ab, ob sie ihm gefallen oder mißfallen, ob sie ihn anziehen oder abstoßen, ob sie ihm nutzen oder schaden. Diese ganz natürliche Art, die Sachen anzusehen und zu beurteilen, scheint so leicht zu sein, als sie notwendig ist, und doch ist der Mensch dabei tausend Irrtümern ausgesetzt, die ihn oft beschämen und ihm das Leben verbittern. (1)   

    (1) When the human being becomes aware of the objects all around himself, he observes them with reference to himself, and rightly.  For thereon his destiny depends entirely, whether they please or displease him, whether they attract or repel him, whether they avail or derogate him.  This entirely natural mode seems to be so facile, the things must be regarded and evaluated as necessary, and nevertheless is the human being exposed thereby to a thousand errors, which often discountenance him and fill the life for him with bitterness.  (1)

(Date of Translation: January 24, 2005)  

 (1)  In the true art of persuasion does the profound poet, Goethe, introduce in the first passage of his essay on the metaphysics of objective science, Der Versuch als Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt, the fundamental division of the universal as between object and subject, between that which is available for perception in the world about and the subjective observer of that world.  The power of observation of the subject, the observer, any observer, is given its reality; the frame of reference for the objective scientific query is immediately given over to the self.  Nor does this scientific giant Goethe in his characteristic drive for truth demur in drawing up the the results of how one perceives objective reality from the perspective of reference to the self; for he follows through with the statement of these two constituents of reality, the objective realm and the subjective self, and their relationship as per awareness of the self with the results as summated unto destiny for that self.  True and total is this result of destiny as drawn by the sheer power of the relationship of an individual with the world about that individual; so true it is, as Goethe advises, that his transcendence of vision is expressed as perspicaciously as the author would himself practice as a scientist: likes and dislikes do not matter in the face of ongoing reality.  One such reality is, and it is evaluated further as according to the relationship one holds with that objective reality of which one is aware, he warns; whereas, easy as it may seem, are things not specious in their disposition for such awareful review itself, whilst at the same time necessary?  Such errors which abound inevitably but for this verisimilitude of that which is evaluated with what it actually is for the one constrained yet unto destiny inexorably, as we all know, can indeed cause the crash of all perception into one total conclusion which correlates with hurt throughout all subsequent perceptions and observations in life together.  

Now this departure by Goethe into the realm of a possible human condition as formed of miscalculation upon matters regarding all things certainly illustrates the results of wrongly attaching the emotions to the nature of things, which can so evade proper observation while they seem so direct.  Moreover, this mode of observation and evaluation of things is a natural one, and one in which all must engage only through simple awareness.  As Goethe will henceforth in this essay derive the higher truths and their related truths, those that speak and teach of scientific exploration, duty and method, coupled with the nature of the communal scientific endeavor among scientists, the outcome of the condition of the one who receives the message of Goethe will be far from abject, and that is for certain.  Herein will one aspiring to be a scientist or a better scientist see the true gems of a giant who can take apart a wrongly thinking observer with the full compassion of one who understands how things can be misunderstood, and who can effortlessly instruct as to how to set up and interpret the proper inquiry after truth as according to the universal nature of truth, from whence all else is drawn.  Allow me to illustrate the most cogent point of all truth which is the overarching conceptual basis of the metaphysics from which Goethe draws his explication of scientific method at the outset of this commentary with this quote from the twenty-fifth passage of his essay:  

          Since everything in nature, however, especially the universal powers and elements, is in an everlasting effect and counter-effect, so one can say of every one phenomenon, that it stands with countless others in connection, as we from a free-floating, luminous point say that he sends out his rays towards all sides.  (25)

          Da alles in der Natur, besonders aber die allgemeinern Kräfte und Elemente, in einer ewigen Wirkung und Gegenwirkung sind, so kann man von einem jeden Phänomene sagen, daß es mit unzähligen andem in Verbindung stehe, wie wir von einem freischwebenden leuchtenden Punkte sagen, daß er seine Strahlen nach allen Seiten aussende.  (25)  

     One should be encouraged, and ultimately upon deeper reflections, yes, upon deeper contemplations, enlightened that the author Goethe as scientist would embrace the human condition first; from that common basis does Goethe present his evidence as to how the way one perceives the nature of things as universally evident in the life for an individual can be extrapolated then through a universal reach into the world of overall objective scientific enterprise for valid result.  Goethe in the words of this essay can veritably create a scientist in an individual with the propensity for science.  Goethe in this work more than works to fascinate with truth as if it were his own.  He ascends to a parlor of discussion of truth, though trenchant his opening threat, to an open parlor where softness imbues all subjective seekers and all putative objects by harmless and inviting light, and where none can lose even a glint or a ray, for such would tend to fill any nook, any shadow.  One can imagine that the scientific community of his own time had learned and prospered from contemplating the substance of Der Versuch als Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt.  Goethe does ascend to that height of truth requisite to understanding the nature of science, still he does not seem as lofty; he knows how to achieve a concrete result persuasively, and yet from the transcendental knowledge of science which he avers, and humbly and honestly so.  

Mighty as is the stride of today's scientific and technological enterprise for all who live in its massive construct both conceptually at some level, and certainly physically throughout most of the world: can we not also learn of the ways of science from Goethe in a global community nowadays whose rudder has become science, and whose need for the scientific acumen to remain ever sharpened astonishes everyone widely?  Are we ready as a scientific community now of man to countenance the challenges of unraveling the very presence of nature on the planet, where originally scientific man had concerned himself with the basic questions of natural science in a more reverential way?  Perhaps the gift of Goethe's genius in the scientific realm can in this century offer us guidance in the very progression of the science we extrapolate now into everyday life, so that its surge of truth will not indeed blind as to destiny for all mankind.  In the life of an individual the most acute battle is that for one's own destiny.  Is mankind not the sum total of all individuals who are now grouped together within the intellectual force of the power of science to shape life's destiny for each individual way on up to the grand sum of all individuals in the world?  This grand sum of all, who are presently in the moment of science to direct the health and longevity of the planet, as well, might even still look back on the more ancient science and its pristine spirit for needed direction and assurance of preservation.  Goethe certainly bows unto some such universal spirit, for he says, "...as we from a free-floating, luminous point say that he sends out his rays towards all sides." (25)    (1)    

  (2) Ein weit schwereres Tagewerk übernehmen diejenigen, deren lebhafter Trieb nach Kenntnis die Gegenstände der Natur an sich selbst und in ihren Verhältnissen untereinander zu beobachten strebt: denn sie vermissen bald den Maßstab, der ihnen zu Hülfe kam, wenn sie als Menschen die Dinge in bezug auf sich betrachteten. Es fehlt ihnen der Maßstab des Gefallens und Mißfallens, des Anziehens und Abstoßens, des Nutzens und Schadens; diesem sollen sie ganz entsagen, sie sollen als gleichgültige und gleichsam göttliche Wesen suchen und untersuchen, was ist, und nicht, was behagt. So soll den echten Botaniker weder die Schönheit noch die Nutzbarkeit der Pflanzen rühren, er soll ihre Bildung, ihr Verhältnis zu dem übrigen Pflanzenreiche untersuchen; und wie sie alle von der Sonne hervorgelockt und beschienen werden, so soll er mit einem gleichen ruhigen Blicke sie alle ansehen und übersehen und den Maßstab zu dieser Erkenntnis die Data der Beurteilung nicht aus sich, sondern aus dem Kreise der Dinge nehmen, die er beobachtet.  (2)   

   (2) A more well-labored daily task do those undertake, whose spirited desire aspires to skills to observe the objects of nature by themselves and in their relationships among one another: for they soon miss the standard, which came to help them, if they regarded the things relating to themselves as people.  For them fails the standard of favor and of disfavor, of advance and of repulse, of avail and of adversity; they are supposed to fairly renounce this, they are supposed to seek and determine as neutral and at the same time godly beings what is, and not what suits.  Thus should neither the beauty nor the usability of the plants stir the true botanist, he should explore their creation, their relationship to the extant plant kingdom; and as they all are elicited and illuminated by the sun, thus he should with a like calm view regard and survey them all, and should take the standard for this knowledge, the data of evaluation, not from himself but from the sphere of things which he observes.  (2)

(Translated on: January 25 & 26, 2005; edited June 26, 2005) 

   (2) Goethe impresses herein further upon the reasoning mind that even though the things of nature are to be regarded with reference to the self, that self, the observer, must detach from the objects being observed.  Even as the observer had seen the way to the outcome of wrong evaluation of things in other individuals as the cause of their certain malaise, perhaps, and thus had learned that there must be a way on the other hand to regard and evaluate things of the world with an accuracy and useful objective; even as the destiny of the observer can be sought after through lessons of insight into the correctness of the relationship of others of close acquaintance to the world they thus define by their power of perception in regards to then again their own destinies; even as an astute observer can summon up these observations that there is a science to how the self pursues destiny in a context in the world which gains its meaning and mode through the reference point of the self in that world, both by inner reflections and conclusions drawn from knowing others, still, the objective realm of scientific endeavor must be held in its place for what it is.  The careful definition of how to approach empirical observation of the natural world is in this second passage liberated from the familiar tethers of social bonds, for Goethe rather steps outside the social frame of reference and sees into the world of objects; with agile wit does he declare what must be likely for a scientific mind to assume in his day of younger plant science, when ideas that objects might be objectified not purely to empirical scrutiny in the scientific endeavor, but perhaps instead to the confusion over them created by attachment to them by transposing onto them the human sentiments and inevitable jealousies of fellow empirical observers.  Objects are not people, Goethe reminds boldly.  Objects are to be regarded and observed in a process of evaluation which owes its acuity not to the self as an emotional being who lives by social wants and needs and sentiments.  To thus wrongly project a subjectively-born bias onto the objective realm of scientific pursuit of the nature of things will be a task poorly spent upon such realm.  Goethe perceives fundamentally that the objects of likely interest must be observed for what they are by themselves, and in how they relate to one another in order to establish of them any conclusive evidence, to which he refers as the standard for knowledge of them; only within the sphere of those things will such evidence for knowledge lie, and it cannot be derived by any but a detached observer who should emulate Goethe's image of the power of nature as taken from the sun.  The sun as the giver of life to the world of botany calmly views the plants as their lives are shone upon; similarly, Goethe so eloquently invites the botanist, the true botanist, to regard the plants with like dispassion and learn of their sphere, not of their sphere as yet a  projection of himself.  

The German word der Gegenstand can mean both subject and object, subject-matter and topic, and also matter and purpose.  The English words subject and object are also interchangeable in similar respects, whereas subject as the one whose consciousness defines the perceiver of objects or matters is usually connoted in the vocabulary of metaphysics.  Goethe  at the outset of the essay sets forth the concepts in words of what must be intended as the division between subject and object for his subsequent metaphysical disquisition: "Sobald der Mensch die Gegenstände um sich her gewahr wird..." defines the intended concept of sheer object as the translational counterpart of Goethe's use of the word der Gegenstand.  This word usage simplifies the conceptual undertaking for the one who wishes to receive the message of the essay under consideration.  Since the English words for subject and object are interchangeable anyway, to argue the usage would be almost frivolous.  The conceptual outcome for this translator and commentator will be the ultimate test of how best to translate the important word der Gegenstand herein.  Moreover, the German word der Gegenstand when it does linearize into English as subject only means subject as a matter which is an object for study or as an item, anyway.  The word gegen as a German preposition intends the meaning against, while -stand derives from the verb stehen, to stand, most prominently, and also to become.  The ubiquity of the verbal root sta- is listed here: in Latin stare, to stand , in English to stand, now in German as stehen, and back further in time to Sanskrit, stha as a verbal root or dhatu meaning to stand, also.  The implication of the verb to stand in the sense of to inhere in matter, to exist, to comprise, or to constitute is quite typical in many languages where it appears in some form.  To stand against, the literal German derivation, does not so much express contrariety per se, as it would mean in the way as a sheer placement, perhaps towards.  The German word for self as subject with the full 'I-ness' intended is indeed Ich or Selbst, whereas Goethe chooses to write from the third person, der Mensch, when referring to the empiricist, the subjective persona.  To envision that self as juxtaposed to the world, the objective realm about the self, that which stands to be regarded by the self in a sense stands against the self positionally at least; this same etymological idea is found in the Latin roots of the English word object.  Ob in Latin can mean in the way, and the other root is the verb iacere, to throw.  These words are discussed in some detail here so as to persuade in the choice of object as the correct translation of the word der Gegenstand.  This should build an important precept of the act of translation: accuracy of intent or identity of match, even through the two languages in question.  Goethe himself has carefully delineated three levels of translations.  Briefly here, the third level of translation, or epoch, as he names it, seeks an identical match to the original.  Incidentally, this had been my goal at the very outset of my work in translating Goethe's scientific writings.  This standard of exact correlation of one language as it is translated into another lends an interlinear approach to the translating, which is desirable in that it crosses the language line with the greatest level of meaning remaining intact.  Please may I refer you to the following link for a translation of the passage in Noten und Abhandlungen zu besseren Verständnis des West-östlichen Divans by Goethe in which he discusses the three types of translations he sees: http://www.othervoices.org/2.2/waltje/.  (2)   

  (3) Sobald wir einen Gegenstand in Beziehung auf sich selbst und in Verhältnis mit andern betrachten und denselben nicht unmittelbar entweder begehren oder verabscheuen, so werden wir mit einer ruhigen Aufmerksamkeit uns bald von ihm, seinen Teilen, seinen Verhältnissen einen ziemlich deutlichen Begriff machen können. Je weiter wir diese Betrachtungen fortsetzen, je mehr wir Gegenstände untereinander verknüpfen, desto mehr üben wir die Beobachtungsgabe, die in uns ist. Wissen wir in Handlungen diese Erkenntnisse auf uns zu beziehen, so verdienen wir klug genannt zu werden. Für einen jeden wohl organisierten Menschen, der entweder von Natur mäßig ist oder durch die Umstände mäßig eingeschränkt wird, ist die Klugheit keine schwere Sache: denn das Leben weist uns bei jedem Schritte zurecht. Allein wenn der Beobachter eben diese scharfe Urteilskraft zur Prüfung geheimer Naturverhältnisse anwenden, wenn er in einer Welt, in der er gleichsam allein ist, auf seine eigenen Tritte und Schritte acht geben, sich vor jeder Übereilung hüten, seinen Zweck stets in Augen haben soll, ohne doch selbst auf dem Wege irgendeinen nützlichen oder schädlichen Umstand unbemerkt vorbei zu lassen; wenn er auch da, wo er von niemand so leicht kontrolliert werden kann, sein eigner strengster Beobachter sein und bei seinen eifrigsten Bemühungen immer gegen sich selbst mißtrauisch sein soll: so sieht wohl jeder, wie streng diese Forderungen sind und wie wenig man hoffen kann, sie ganz erfüllt zu sehen, man mag sie nun an andere oder an sich machen. Doch müssen uns diese Schwierigkeiten, ja man darf wohl sagen diese hypothetische Unmöglichkeit, nicht abhalten, das möglichste zu tun, und wir werden wenigstens am weitsten kommen, wenn wir uns die Mittel im allgemeinen zu vergegenwärtigen suchen, wodurch vorzügliche Menschen die Wissenschaften zu erweitern gewußt haben; wenn wir die Abwege genau bezeichnen, auf welchen sie sich verirrt und auf welchen ihnen manchmal Jahrhunderte eine große Anzahl von Schülern folgten, bis spätere Erfahrungen erst wieder den Beobachter auf den rechten Weg einleiteten.  (3)   

   (3) As soon as we observe an object with respect to itself and in relationship with others, and neither desire nor misprize the same directly, thus will we soon be able to confect with a calm attention to ourselves by it, its details, its relationships, a quite clear concept.   The further we carry forth these considerations, the more we associate objects among one another, the more we practice the power of observation which is in us.  If we know how to reference unto ourselves these perceptions in actions, thus are we worthy of being called intelligent.  For anyone who is a well-organized person, who either is moderate by nature or is restricted through moderate circumstances, is the intelligence no weighty matter: since the life reprehends us at each step.  If the observer applies also this trenchant power of judgment for inquiry alone of the secret relationships of nature, if he attends to his own step and stride in a world in which he is alone, as it were, he is on guard against any precipitancy, should have ever his intended purpose in vision, however, without himself allowing someone to pass unnoticed on the way, either in useful or detrimental circumstance; when there, he also is his own most strict observer,  where he can  be examined by no one so easily, and with his most assiduous efforts he always should be mistrustful towards himself: thus everybody probably sees how strict these demands are and how little one can hope to see them totally fulfilled; one may render them now for others or for himself.  These difficulties still must not deter us, yea, one ought to state this hypothetical impossibility arguably the most possible one to do; and we will arrive at least most far, if we seek to envision for ourselves the means in general through which the most excellent persons have known how to upgrade the sciences, when we properly call the wrong ways in which they have lost the way and upon which (way) for them a great number of scholars followed sometimes for centuries, until later researches again first initiated the observer upon the right way.  (3)

(Translated on: Jamuary 26, 30 & 31 2005)

  (3) In this passage Goethe leaps now into an in-depth description of what realm lies beyond for the one who successfully endeavors to enter into the practice of scientific research.  First, this astute scientist Goethe has stated how to tap intelligence for its empirical capabilities through detaching from personal sentiments regarding the work at hand; he has now further depicted the conceptual correlate to the nature of all things as that power of association in the mind of the researcher.  This power of association matches all things which are by their nature interconnected and in a state of flux in regards to one another in what he terms effect and counter-effect.  In order to be able to find how things associate with one another and thus unlock the truth of nature, Goethe advises, the cogent requirement that the researcher reference himself properly unto the objects at hand is once again recited, and although he does not outline scientific method as we list it, he calls further for taking actions which are in keeping with such proper referencing of the self with the perceptions at hand; this is the sine qua non of all scientific experiment.  Once the prescriptive measures for practicing good science are set thus forth metaphysically, Goethe treats the questions of possible competitive awareness within the field of science, so that comparative minds of like endeavor in the scientific arena will not deter the engaged scientist.  It is upon this theme of the self, the individual inquirer against the collective of scientists past and present, that Goethe elaborates and renders the prescriptive measure for the dedicated scientific mind to find its own in research to the extent that a given development of scientific knowledge may be recovered even from wrong conclusion, and even if that wrong conclusion had persisted in time down through centuries.  His outstanding contribution of his given level of insight based upon the truth of science shines forth in this paragraph, as Goethe is able to summon prospectively the full potential of the human intellect to its more ultimate actuation in scientific research; if truly able to remain virtually solipsistic when regarding the relationships of objects of inquiry to one another, yet mindful also of fellow scientists along the way, and those of the past connected to that same inquiry, Goethe ably gives the power of solution to even long-standing false perception in science to the lone empiricist.  One can only imagine how these words might have stirred Goethe's contemporaries and those scientists who followed him.  (3)  

 (November 21, 2005)

  (4) Daß die Erfahrung, wie in allem, was der Mensch nimmt, so auch in der Naturlehre, von der ich gegenwärtig vorzüglich spreche, den größten Einfluß habe und haben solle, wird niemand leugnen, so wenig als man den Seelenkräften, in welchen diese Erfahrungen aufgefaßt, zusammengenommen, geordnet und ausgebildet werden, ihre hohe und gleichsam schöpferisch unabhängige Kraft absprechen wird. Allein wie diese Erfahrungen zu machen und wie sie zu nutzen, wie unsere Kräfte auszubilden und zu brauchen, das kann weder so allgemein bekannt noch anerkannt sein.  (4)   

 (4) No one will deny that experience, as in all which the human being takes, has and should have the greatest impact; thus also in the apprenticeship of nature of which presently I speak excellently, so little as one is denied for the spiritual powers their high, and, as it were, creatively unhinged agency in which these researchings are understood, braced up, ordered and developed.  How by yourself to create these researchings and how to make use of them, how to develop and to require our powers, which can neither be so universally known nor recognized.  (4)

(February 1, 2005; revised November 21, 2005)

(4) Goethe places the natural scientist in the juxtaposition between the power of empirical observation and the universal power of nature which inheres in all things.  He universalizes the meaning of all research unto the spiritual power which, but for its immanence, need only reveal its creative contribution in the apprenticeship to nature when its causal aspect is undone and thus understood.  However, in Goethe there exists a surrender to the less powerful ability of the human inquirer to tap so much with repletion the omnipotence of nature as to her causal basis due to the limitation of the ignorance of man's powers, which he states cannot lend themselves to such full awareness.  Goethe again invites the contemplative mind to liken the place of experience in life to the place of the mind of the scientist to observe and conclude with validity upon the questions of objective science.  If one such natural scientist can absorb  through the subjective side of  experience in everyday life that which makes the greatest impression upon him, then also might that scientist transcend unto the powers of nature accordingly.  Even if the attainment of that goal of transcendence necessarily falls short of full actuation unto the universal level, which Goethe states that it will fall short of it, still, the greatest impression will be made when the spiritual presence in nature is sought out at any level for its result.  This passage places in the mind of the student of the science of Goethe his essential reverence for the spirit as expressed in all of nature.  Nor does Goethe covet the fact that the universal power of nature is the key to valid scientific undertakings; rather does he characteristically convey the key of such truth with an humble sense that it must be stated.  (4) 

 (November 22, 2005; edited December 27, 2005)

  (5) Sobald Menschen von scharfen frischen Sinnen auf Gegenstände aufmerksam gemacht werden, findet man sie zu Beobachtungen so geneigt als geschickt. Ich habe dieses oft bemerken können, seitdem ich die Lehre des Lichts und der Farben mit Eifer behandle und, wie es zu geschehen pflegt, mich auch mit Personen, denen solche Betrachtungen sonst fremd sind, von dem, was mich soeben sehr interessiert, unterhalte. Sobald ihre Aufmerksamkeit nur rege war, bemerkten sie Phänomene, die ich teils nicht gekannt, teils übersehen hatte, und berichtigten dadurch gar oft eine voreilig gefasste Idee, ja gaben mir Anlass, schnellere Schritte zu tun und aus der Einschränkung herauszutreten, in welcher uns eine mühsame Untersuchung oft gefangen hält.  (5)   

   (5) Once men are called to attention of objects from keen, recent reflections, they are found as well-disposed towards observations as clever.  I have been able to observe this often, since I examine the lesson of light and of colors with assiduousness; and, as it tends to happen, converse also with people of that which just now interests me greatly, and  to whom such contemplations otherwise are strange.  Only as soon as their attention was alive did they notice phenomena which I partly had not known, partly had overlooked, and thereby often corrected an even prematurely collected idea, yea, which gave me reason to make more haste in steps and to step out of the constraint in which a laborious trial often detains us.  (5)

(June 6 & 8, 2005; revised November 22, 2005))

   (5) The profound humility of Goethe provides a vantage point from which a developing scientist can learn.  How typical is the way of science to give the one who remains open to the observations of others in a non-jealous fashion even greater ideas of the meaning of empirical results, so that the progression of experiments can be focused ever more sharply towards those of the most central and giving truth.  Here Goethe points out that even though others were unfamiliar with his contemplations on light and colors, did they still teach him more of what he had missed, and refresh his patience to keep a careful vigilance as to the succession of steps in his work.  The community of interested scientists may always benefit from reviewing the importance of sharing and working together towards success, so that the concept of credit in findings may find its own as also from the collective venture which is the scientific endeavor.  In return for that attitude towards fair distribution of interest and towards the shared collective in scientific research can the scientist receive a renewal in patience towards facing the tedium which may accompany the work which a new frontier, a new venture of research presents, if only there can be an openness in the ongoing work born of the sheer love of truth together among scientists.  Other minds are bound to refresh the outlook of one belabored with the difficulties of proving a new point, or even redirecting the conceptual progression in the growth of a given sector of knowledge.  (5)

(November 22, 2005)

  (6) Es gilt also auch hier, was bei so vielen andern menschlichen Unternehmungen gilt, dass nur das Interesse mehrerer auf einen Punkt gerichtet etwas Vorzügliches hervorzubringen imstande sei. Hier wird es offenbar, dass der Neid, welcher andere so gern von der Ehre einer Entdeckung ausschließen möchte, dass die unmäßige Begierde, etwas Entdecktes nur nach seiner Art zu behandeln und auszuarbeiten, dem Forscher selbst das größte Hindernis sei.  (6)  

   (6) It is essential also here, what weighs with so many other human undertakings, that only the interest of several directed towards a point would be able to produce something exemplary.  Here it becomes manifest that the envy,  that the inordinate ambition, which would so fancy to exclude others from the honor of a discovery, of something discovered only according to its kind to examine and to work out, would be to the researcher himself the greatest hindrance.  (6)

(June 9, 2005)

   (6) Indeed, Goethe amplifies the ultimate meaning and inhibitory power of disincluding others in any discovery which by its own nature scientific research will be bound to give.  Such exclusion itself can become the greatest hindrance to the work of a researcher, since the collective interest is bound to give the most exemplary results of all in these words of Goethe.  (6)

(November 22, 2005)

  (7) Ich habe mich bisher bei der Methode, mit mehreren zu arbeiten, zu wohl befunden, als daß ich nicht solche fortsetzen sollte. Ich weiß genau, wem ich dieses und jenes auf meinem Wege schuldig geworden, und es soll mir eine Freude sein, es künftig öffentlich bekannt zu machen.  (7)  

 (7) I have been provided too well with the method so far in working with several, than that I should not pursue such.  I know exactly to whom I have become due for this and that upon my way, and it should be a joy for me to make it known officially henceforth.  (7)  

(June 2 & 5; revised November 22,  2005)

   (7) In this seventh passage Goethe reveals that he has taken the lessons in science rendered him through any collective undertaking.  By openly confessing that fact and now broadly declaring the truth of these conclusions which he must have drawn regarding the superiority of method in working with several fellow scientists equitably,  does Goethe hope to win others over to the revelation of truth he undoubtedly had found in the value of the collective endeavor in science.  Nor does he forget to whom he owes credit upon specific points along the way of his works.  (7)

(November 22, 2005)  

  (8) Sind uns nun bloß natürliche, aufmerksame Menschen so viel zu nützen imstande, wie allgemeiner muß der Nutzen sein, wenn unterrichtete Menschen einander in die Hände arbeiten! Schon ist eine Wissenschaft an und für sich selbst eine so große Masse, daß sie viele Menschen trägt, wenn sie gleich kein Mensch tragen kann. Es läßt sich bemerken, daß die Kenntnisse, gleichsam wie ein eingeschlossenes aber lebendiges Wasser, sich nach und nach zu einem gewissen Niveau erheben, daß die schönsten Entdeckungen nicht sowohl durch Menschen als durch die Zeit gemacht worden; wie denn eben sehr wichtige Dinge zu gleicher Zeit von zweien oder wohl gar mehreren geübten Denkern gemacht worden. Wenn also wir in jenem ersten Fall der Gesellschaft und den Freunden so vieles schuldig sind, so werden wir in diesem der Welt und dem Jahrhundert noch mehr schuldig, und wir können in beiden Fällen nicht genug anerkennen, wie nötig Mitteilung, Beihülfe, Erinnerung und Widerspruch sei, um uns auf dem rechten Wege zu erhalten und vorwärts zu bringen.  (8)  

 (8) Now attentive, natural people are simply able to be of use to us as much as more general the avail must be, if knowledgeable people are engaging each other in the hands!  A science in and for itself is already so great a host, that it sustains many men, whether it can carry no one in a short while.  It can be observed that knowledge, like a quasi-enclosed but vital water, rises bit-by-bit to a certain level, and that the most superb discoveries have been made not through men as through time; for how it is that very important things have even been done at the same time by two or several well-conversant thinkers.  So if we owe so much in that first case to society and friends, thus we will still owe more in this to the world and to the century, and we cannot accredit in both cases enough, as it must take communication, abetment, retrospection and variance in order to achieve for ourselves in the right way and in order to advance.  (8)

(June 10,  11 & 14; revised November 22, 2005)

   (8) Goethe embraces the wider quest of science to serve towards propriety and advancement, citing the inconspicuous aspect of those in science who have discovered truths not so much through individual quest and accomplishment, as through the timing itself of a growing body of knowledge to which they are connected.  Notice that Goethe likens the knowledge which is gained in science to a body of water, whose poetic image connotes purifying; as the minds of individuals who conduct research must join a collective, so will they all see the rarefying of truths which contribute if only slightly to the growing understanding of the nature of things, an understanding that they help create.  This might point out to many who aspire in scientific research to learn how to swallow their individual false egos and surrender to the more universal purpose at hand.  Since science, Goethe says, is so generous in its accommodation of those who seek its corridor, the case actually is made against the all-important ego of one versus the natural formation of the many in its assemblage of engaged researchers; where one might not succeed alone, the hands of many knowledgeable people working together might be able to attain to a higher level of use and awareness for success instead of failure.  The remarkable accomplishments of the scientific genius of Goethe might be better comprehended in light of his tutelage herein on the nature of scientific enterprise, since he must be recounting from experience as to his great success.  Moreover, science has not changed in this respect across the centuries since Goethe lived and practiced it.  It would behoove all those interested in the well-being of our contemporaneous, highly sophisticated science-oriented day to know the nature of how science works as a social entity as much as it works as according to the effect which one individual practitioner might have on its progression.  We hear of founders, of giants the likes of Goethe, and imagine that all of mankind can be swayed by the awesome intellect of one individual scientist; true, but the guardian power of the fellowship of the many involved in the far-reaching questions which lead in any day of science can only be consoling and encouraging to the one who has no especial propensity for deeper scientific understanding and formulation of conceptual awareness in science.  

Perhaps it was the fundamental reverence Goethe held for the scientific pursuit which gave him the success he enjoyed, since others were not as put off by his prowess therefore.  If a researcher today, for example, ventures more closely into the depths of knowledge of a molecule of possible detrimental power, would not his or her fellow scientists be less prepared to join in the research, knowing that the potentially destructive power of the molecule must not be actuated?  That guard against irreverence for the social contract which is philosophically and implicitly written into the purpose and goal of science, that others would naturally be in the know of a particular avenue of research of questionably good use, should shore up the beneficial uses of science as occupying the first and highest priority as it grows and gains stature in our current civilization.  It is noteworthy that one of Goethe's unusual intellectual level would speak so lucidly here as to how the outcome of scientific inquiry is as much collectively carried as it is the result of one towering genius, for Goethe was certainly one such towering genius.  That Goethe left for posterity the wisdom of this insight into the broad social venue that is the real practice of science, besides its demands as placed upon the individual to withstand the law of mass action of like minds who might have erred in perception of scientific truth at a given time, will tell its effects upon mankind as much as his wisdom is read and realized, if not offered remedially for some erring instances.  (8)

(November 22, 2005)

    (9) Man hat daher in wissenschaftlichen Dingen gerade das Gegenteil von dem zu tun, was der Künstler rätlich findet: denn er tut wohl, sein Kunstwerk nicht öffentlich sehen zu lassen, bis es vollendet ist, weil ihm nicht leicht jemand raten noch Beistand leisten kann; ist es hingegen vollendet, so hat er alsdann den Tadel oder das Lob zu überlegen und zu beherzigen, solches mit seiner Erfahrung zu vereinigen und sich dadurch zu einem neuem Werke auszubilden und vorzubereiten. In wissenschaftlichen Dingen hingegen ist es schon nützlich, jede einzelne Erfahrung, ja Vermutung öffentlich mitzuteilen; und es ist höchst rätlich, ein wissenschaftliches Gebäude nicht eher aufzuführen, bis der Plan dazu und die Materialien allgemein bekannt, beurteilt ausgewählt sind.  (9)   

 (9) Therefore, one has to do precisely the opposite in scientific things of that what the artist finds advisable: because he does well not to allow his artwork to be seen publicly until it is completed, since anyone cannot advise him lightly, yet render support; whereas, if it is completed, he has thereupon to thus consider and heed the reproof or the commendation, to unite such with his operating experience, and cultivate and prepare himself thereby for a new work.  Whereas, in scientific things is it yet expedient to impart openly each individual research, yes, supposition; and it is greatly advisable not to first stage a scientific edifice until the concept for this purpose and the materials generally are known, evaluated, and selected.  (9)

(June 14 & 18 & July 15, 2005)

   (9) Goethe herein warns that science and art differ fundamentally in one important aspect: the scientific research endeavor by its nature lends itself to a communal aspect for its progress, inviting the support of needed hands and intellects in its own time; time, indeed, is as much the sayer of the growth of a body of scientific knowledge, so that the referencing of the self by the individual practitioner of science in full surrender to the nature of truth being sought after from the more universal aspect of the truth of all things will also obscure the place of one who accomplishes in science to that of a mere role-player set up under the auspices of time, of sheer timing in experimental venture.  Art, on the other hand, does not lend itself to such a communal involvement as it is being actively created necessarily.  The artist makes a statement which is born rather out of subjective moorings, and which should not be perturbed by the sentiments of others until it is completed.  Upon the airing of an artistic work in its completed form can the artist respond to the reactions of others to that work, and from there receive a similar, public guidance in the message of the reaction, applying it only retrospectively to the operating process of artistic creation.  The reaction of others to an artist's work once completed will help cultivate the artist, in that future work will be responsive to that response of others, the promise of art being thus rendered.  Thereby is the artist's work cultivated still within the framework of the society-at-large, yet the method allows for a derivation of the work from a more individualistic viewpoint as per expression.  The artist's job is to imitate reality, whereas the scientist's job is to find reality with a clear relationship with the objective reality therefore.  This difference is commonly referred to as poetic license, and anyone who has either embarked upon deeper artistic involvements creatively or interacted with one who is so embarked can readily understand how important the insular aspect of the creative artistic mode to the artist.  As one reads and understands the guidance which Goethe offers in this passage, it is important to recognize that Goethe was also a superb artist in the literary field.  He wrote the most popular version of the story of Faust in the dramatic literature.  Goethe was a prolific and commanding poet and novelist.  Goethe stands as one of the greatest and most versatile intellectual giants in all time of the Western civilization.  That Goethe could advise as to how to regard the scientific endeavor and compare it to the artistic endeavor as cogently as he does herein is itself a testimony unto his own sheer operating knowledge in both realms of work.  (9) 

(November 28 & 30, 2005)

(10)Wenn wir die Erfahrungen, welche vor uns gemacht worden, die wir selbst oder andere zu gleicher Zeit mit uns machen, vorsätzlich wiederholen und die Phänomene, die teils zufällig, teils künstlich entstanden sind, wieder darstellen, so nennen wir dieses einen Versuch.  (10)   

 (10) If we intentionally repeat the researchings which have been done before us, which we ourselves or others do at the same time with us, and the phenomena which have arisen partly by chance, partly by imitation, present again: thus we call this an experiment.  (10)  

(June 9, 2005; revised November 30, 2005)

   (10) Having unfolded the fundamental differences between the artist's method and relationship to the society as compared to that of the scientist, Goethe now proposes the idea that scientific work will not be validated as an experiment until it has indeed been sanctioned by the wider collective of minds involved in what has become a hopeful tenet of scientific truth in his day.  (10)

(November 30, 2005)

(11) Der Wert eines Versuchs besteht vorzüglich darin, daß er, er sei nun einfach oder zusammengesetzt, unter gewissen Bedingungen mit einem bekannten Apparat und mit erforderlicher Geschicklichkeit jederzeit wieder hervorgebracht werden könne, so oft sich die bedingten Umstände vereinigen lassen. Wir bewundern mit Recht den menschlichen Verstand, wenn wir auch nur obenhin die Kombinationen ansehen, die er zu diesem Endzwecke gemacht hat, und die Maschinen betrachten, die dazu erfunden worden sind und man darf wohl sagen täglich erfunden werden.  (11)   

 (11) The value of an experiment consists as excellent therein, that it under certain conditions now simple or complex with an established apparatus and with essential skill could be produced again every time -- that way the conditional cases can often be collated.  We admire rightfully the human intellect if we but understand superficially the combinations also, which it has confected towards the final causes, and which considers machines, which for this purpose have been invented, and it should be said will daily have been invented.  (11)

(July 7 & 11, 2005; revised November 30, 2005)

   (11) Herein does Goethe express how science can reach its optimum level of truth assay when an experiment shows consistency through its successful production every time.  Note that the terms we consider traditional in discussing scientific research are not present in the conceptual vocabulary of Goethe, terms such as materials and methods, results, conclusions; rather, he speaks in more rarefied concepts which illustrate that he does follow the clear objective a contemporary scientist of today would expect.  In expressing his observation of the scientific acumen Goethe reveals his status as a person who was engrossed in scientific exploration when science was much younger and less developed than it is now; the conditional aspects of empirical interest were of course most critical to the keen power of observation Goethe would expect of his contemporary, and one can imagine that he must also have been motivated to write this treatise so as to clarify his understanding of valid scientific thinking in order to establish such more solidly in his time.  (11)

(November 30, 2005)

(12) So schätzbar aber auch ein jeder Versuch einzeln betrachtet sein mag, so erhält er doch nur seinen Wert durch Vereinigung und Verbindung mit andern. Aber eben zwei Versuche, die miteinander einige Ähnlichkeit haben, zu vereinigen und zu verbinden, gehört mehr Strenge und Aufmerksamkeit, als selbst scharfe Beobachter oft von sich gefordert haben. Es können zwei Phänomene miteinander verwandt sein, aber doch noch lange nicht so nah, als wir glauben. Zwei Versuche können scheinen auseinander zu folgen, wenn zwischen ihnen noch eine große Reihe stehen müßte, um sie in eine recht natürliche Verbindung zu bringen.  (12)  

 (12) Though every experiment may also be respectively contemplated as appreciable, still, it only thus gains its worthiness through consortium  and alliance with others.  Now, however, two experiments which have some similarity with each other have to unite and coalesce, appertaining to more precision and thoughtfulness than keen observers often have demanded of themselves.  Two phenomena, however, can be related to each other, yet not for a long time as closely as we believe.  Two experiments can seem to succeed apart, when still a great alignment must stand between them, relating them quite naturally.  (12)

(July 13 & 18, 2005; edited December 23, 2005)  

  (12) Herein Goethe discusses how the empirical mind must surrender to contingencies in scientific experiments in order to accurately prove a causal basis of true worth.  Such contingencies are constituted of other experiments of a similar kind which are observed to display a relationship one to the other.  He points out that a discrete experiment may be in and of itself proven insofar as its measured worth, but that in order for that result to give greater meaning it must be related then again to other similar experiments in order for the scientist to glean any valid conclusions.  Goethe cautions that some observers do not take into proper cognizance the full range of possibilities for results, since precision and deeper thought may be lacking.  In studying phenomena through empirical observation the factor of time must be allowed to express fully before a final conclusion is drawn, since the results of two experiments working in concert to unravel a point of causality may seem to be disattached, when in actuality across greater time there does exist a relationship between them. (12)

(December 23, 2005)

(13) Man kann sich daher nicht genug in acht nehmen, aus Versuchen nicht zu geschwind zu folgern: denn beim Übergang von der Erfahrung zum Urteil, von der Erkenntnis zur Anwendung ist es, wo dem Menschen gleichsam wie an einem Passe alle seine inneren Feinde auflauern, Einbildungskraft, Ungeduld, Vorschnelligkeit, Selbstzufriedenheit, Steifheit, Gedankenform, vorgefaßte Meinung, Bequemlichkeit, Leichtsinn, Veränderlichkeit und wie die ganze Schar mit ihrem Gefolge heißen mag, alle liegen hier im Hinterhalte und überwältigen unversehens sowohl den handelnden Weltmann als auch den stillen, vor allen Leidenschaften gesichert scheinenden Beobachter.  (13)   

 (13) Therefore, one cannot be careful enough not to deduce too swiftly from experiments: since it is at the transition of the research to the finding, it is from the knowledge to the application, where for the man, how in a yoke, as it were, all (his) inner foes ambuscade imagination, eagerness, haste, complacency, rigidity, thought-form, preconception, ease, levity and mutability; as she may with her retinue be called an unmitigated host, all lie here in the ambuscade and overpower unawares both the acting sophisticate and the reticent, assured, gleaming observer before all fervors.  (13)   

(July 19 & 20, 2005)

   (13) The poetic majesty of Goethe in this passage gives apt warning to the aspiring   empiricist who pretends to draw conclusions from his observations and results before he allows for the mercurial nature of an unpracticed scientific mind to take its toll upon truth which might be otherwise available from observing nature  through experiment.  Goethe refers to nature as 'die Natur', a feminine noun, and so addresses nature as in the feminine person in his writings.  Neither the confidence of one whose naïveté in scientific explorations has expired, nor the one whose power to observe is of the utmost level, is spared the complexity and steepness of the challenge in attaining to perfection of truth in natural science according to the scientist Goethe. (13)

(December 25, 2005; edited April 8, 2006)

(14) Ich möchte zur Warnung dieser Gefahr, welche größer und näher ist, als man denkt, hier eine Art von Paradoxon aufstellen, um eine lebhaftere Aufmerksamkeit zu erregen. Ich wage nämlich zu behaupten: daß ein Versuch, ja mehrere Versuche in Verbindung nichts beweisen, ja daß nichts gefährlicher sei, als irgendeinen Satz unmittelbar durch Versuche bestätigen zu wollen, und daß die größten Irrtümer eben dadurch entstanden sind, daß man die Gefahr und die Unzulänglichkeit dieser Methode nicht eingesehen. Ich muß mich deutlicher erklären, um nicht in den Verdacht zu geraten, als wollte ich nur etwas Sonderbares sagen.  (14)   

 (14) I would like to establish here a kind of paradox in admonition of this hazard, which is greater and nearer than it is thought, in order to stir a more vibrant attention.  Namely, I venture to maintain: that an experiment, verily, several experiments prove nothing in association; yes, that nothing is more hazardous, than to want to confirm some proposition directly through experiments, and that the greatest errors have arisen even thereby, that the hazard and the insufficiency of this method are not understood.  I must assert myself more explicitly, in order not to get into the suspicion, as I intended only to say something odd.  (14)

(July 26 & 27, 2005; edited December 25 & 26, 2005) 

  (14)  Any person aspiring to the work of science in the day of Goethe might have  gained invaluable instruction from this and the preceding paragraph in Der Versuch als Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt.  Contemporary scientists who are learning the method of scientific research might also gain vital insight by contemplating the meaning of these words of Goethe, although we might pride ourselves in being more advanced fundamentally in our abilities as a scientific culture in this modern day than to have to take direction or correction from this scientific giant of the eighteenth century, and falsely so.  Goethe's guiding light stands and remains as true: to approach scientific work with a predetermined mind as to hypothesis will lead to errors, and this is an error of method whose insufficiency he points out even though it might seem to be odd, and he deems it a paradox accordingly.  Of course, any scientist will harbor an idea of how things being explored scientifically must work; there is a certain foundation of knowledge which has been already proven, and from which a scientist builds as he forms an experiment, except as in the case of a total pioneer.  However, the key is to let the data correlate to the objective reality being uncovered, so that even beyond the mind given over to a supposition of truth, in that same mind there exists the capability to transcend the subjective attachment to a given working hypothesis, and so to open the empirical window even more totally to what actually is.  By negating the inter-association of experiments at the outset of this important and key lesson in science Goethe strikes at the leverage of valid method, wherein to search experiments with a mind already believing in a given outcome will only obstruct the truth and likely introduce error.  Rather, the subjective side of the empirical quest must find as its ulterior goal the fusion of the two, objective reality with subjective empirical power, so that neither the objective nor the subjective predominates in a sense.  If the objective reality predominates, then it can remain a mystery, or remain in the realm of moot speculation; if the subjective mind predominates, then the results of observation may show no real counterpart in the objective correlate, so that results cannot be repeated with consistency.  In order for an hypothesis to be proven and over greater time elevated to theory, from whence sound theoretical postulates may even be proven to be laws together of natural science, the subjective eye of observation must work in a framework of well thought-out possibilities in a detached manner, so that such subjective mind can fuse with the objective reality being explored for its actual nature.¹  Entire misconceptions can thus be brought down in given sectors of science, as well.  The scientific mind will tend to assume a truth while it is unaware that the assumption is even there, and this is typically so when the field of exploration is more newly founded.  Those who go against such hidden and implicit assumptions in scientific venture can be met with profound refutation by others, and that even before the work is truly allowed to blossom forth.  Here below is an illustration of this level of scientific venture, and it relates to modern concepts of growth, but also to the ancient work on growth which Goethe had himself promulgated in plants in his most prominent scientific work, Der Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu Erklären, in which he describes in depth his theory of transmutation of the leaf in explaining the morphogenesis of plants.    

An example of the kind of constraint which is likely to be imposed upon a sector of biological understanding occurs in the idea of growth as has been ferreted out as according to genetic determination coupled with chemical mediation.  D.E. Ingber and others have since proven that growth transcends drastically the confines of strict intracellular mechanisms and how they relate also to cell surface molecular events.  The inconsistencies of fate of cells lying in the same chemical microenvironment, which may have destinies as disparate as death and differentiation, for example, are now within the reach of better understanding according to Ingber, who cites an overall architecture of the tissue comprised of cells as responsible for such phenomena in cells as growth, development, differentiation, apoptosis, and quiescence.  Ingber has contributed to the theory of mechanotransduction as the key to the regulation of tissue morphogenesis; mechanotransduction is the mechanically induced regulation of cell structure and function as mediated at the molecular level by chemical signals and chemical reactions, while these are determined by the presence of the genome.  Ingber takes a different look at the same molecular reality of the cell and tissue when questioning the nature of growth, and maintains that there exists an inherent tension in the skeletal architecture of tissue, wherein the cytoskeleton (CTK) places such as its inherent tension on the ECM (extracellular matrix) in general.  A specialized ECM, the basement membrane (BM), as it reacts to mechanical changes, say, a suture, and flexes with it, causes a change in the shapes of the cells local to that BM compliance, as an example.  This cell distortion is actually the cause of growth, and it is a mechanical cause, so that a mechanochemical control hypothesis in cell growth and function is now replacing the genetically-determined idea of the destiny of cells in their disposition to grow and to function.  Moreover, the entire cytoskeleton of a tissue is drawn up as capable of distortion, and also of transmitting mechanical forces due to the essential tension in the overall structure of cells and tissues, which is called prestress (isometric tension) by Ingber.² Such mechanical forces can target distant cells, and which targetting holds the potential biologically to cause some cells to grow and others to behave differently even within the same microchemical environment, as stated earlier.  Therefore, such events as fractal growth, or growth varying in its geometric facets, can occur, as well as the more direct patterned growth of tissue.  Now, all of cell biology must surrender the theory of the cell membrane as the structure which is the ultimate mediator of cell function as a unit most discrete unto itself as it would react to mechanical impingement, and thus show a biochemical response according to the event of any direct deformation of the cell membrane itself.  Rather, there is an ultimate capacity present in cells to behave with the imposition of mechanical events which is more like a network due to the function of the cytoskeleton to array responses to mechanical events from a superstructural point of view, and that especially as it relates to the cell itself; such capacity further is one which transcends the presence of the cell membrane as the first-order, unitary determinant of its interior biochemical responses.  The actual dynamics of the cytoskeleton, and that as the cytoskeleton relates to points of adhesion between cell surface and the ECM, are shedding a new light on the specificity of cell structure in the context of its unitary nature.  These new discoveries pertaining to mechanical or physical features of the substance of living tissues for its innate tension, which tension is based upon an analysis of rigidity of matter as per the subtlety of tensile strength as opposed to only the grosser points of compression throughout any structure which that matter comprises, termed tensegrity, are elaborating the place of the cell membrane to most directly lend the medium of exchange, the barrier of communicatory events, across which life finds its way through growth, differentiation, development, motility and dying.  Consider accordingly this direct quote from the article by Ingber et alia cited below³ regarding the cell:

            "Internal Cell Deformation Depends on Molecular Connectivity. Established engineering  and biological    models of cell mechanics assume that the dense cortical microfilament network that lies directly beneath the cell membrane is the primary load-bearing element in the cell. In contrast, the cellular tensegrity model predicts that mechanical loads are borne by discrete molecular networks composed of interconnected actin microfilaments, microtubules, and intermediate filaments that extend through the cytoplasm and link to adhesion receptors, such as integrins, that span the cell surface."

Indeed, Ingber says that such adhesion receptors can even be considered as functional organelles.⁴

However, this kind of growth in a body of knowledge known as a particular science, and in the preceding and most interesting case that of cell biology, cannot even begin to expand into a new facet or realm of objective reality if the empirical findings are not solid in the founding work of research in that branch of science.   Such growth as this is made possible through the valid nature of certain elemental experiments, and it may continue as it will until many descriptive truths result.  Imagine how far-reaching the expanse, when even despite the replete nature of such a descriptive body of knowledge, a new thinker arrives and sets out on a totally new course of experimentation which considers that same reality, as painstakingly as it had been ferreted out correctly, and sends such reality into a new margin of supposition, and which margin proceeds to grow and reform the knowledge which had once been considered to be most critical.  Such was the work of Professor Fung in contributing to a theoretical basis of support for mechanotransduction in the question of cell growth.  In the case explicated in depth above of the work on mechanotransduction the interposition of its relevance to the former superior reign of knowledge of molecular genetics and biochemistry in understanding the nature of disease is thought to be critical for future work in medical diagnostic approaches and treatments.  Since many conditions result from the reactions of cells and tissues to mechanical stress, medical science cannot continue to ignore the physical basis of disease and concentrate primarily on altering the physico-chemistry through the use of drugs.  Much as surgery proves its superior place in medicine since it works in the manner of direct structural intervention which in turn alleviates functional dysfunction, so can mechanotransduction prove the physical basis of disease to be ultimately treated at the dynamic level of structural intervention if the mechanisms of cell and tissue growth are further unravelled and better understood through those principles of mechanotransduction while in the heat of rooting out the etiology of disease for its physico-mechanical attributes.  

In conclusion, therefore, how experiments relate to one another can be refuted, certainly, as Goethe says.  In this way, he hopes to gain 'a more vibrant attention' in the acumen of the scientist he would teach.  If one were to expand this same premise of refutation of several experiments as ever relating to one another into the realm of an entire sector of a branch of science, then an entirely new window of discovery will have been created.  In this way of thinking one can apply the sense and logic of Goethe's admonitions to do valid science with the greatest attention possible, yet in a creative way, and not take so much to heart that one can be wrong, as much as one can be not only correct, but also pioneering, if even in a range more narrow than an actual founder such as Newton.  Furthermore, it must with due respect be recognized that Goethe turned out to be the founder of a branch of plant science known as plant morphology, and which also seeks to understand the morphogenesis of plants as a result of determining factors which lie beyond sheer genetics. (14)

¹The words which match the concepts of the development of scientific work from prediction to hypothesis to theory can be intermixed at times, since the lines between these stages of scientific understanding and progress are often blurry, as well, until a validation of scientific truth is achieved.  An hypothesis attempts to encompass both the purported nature of what is in a research question, and why it is so.  These two aspects of the research question support one another, giving more likelihood of truth to the what of an idea as the why of it sustains a favorable probability of being correct and accurate.  Now when the research has progressed to the point of understanding wherein a clear explanation of why something is so has been achieved, an actual theory has evolved.  The theory had to arise, however, from the basis of the nature of the substance, the event, the behavior, or the particular property in question, summed up as 'what is,' and usually this is determined as that nature undergoes its own changes.  Once the essential attribute, characteristic or property of the object for study at hand is more completely understood and described as it changes, then the knowledge so conferred will enable a theory to explain why the change does occur as it does.  If the theory stands the test of truth and bears up in several ways and instances, then that theory may be elevated to the more general use of a law.  A law will be used to delineate often mathematically what the theory explains and purports as why, so that the law which matches a theory will be specific as to the practical instance of a theory; a law will illustrate the theory with measurement and correlative changes of such measurement.  One can read the general equation of a law, understand its parameters and how they correlate with one another, if one also can derive that scientific law from the theoretical basis of the law.  Since a scientific law evolves conceptually from the origin of an hypothesis, wherein the what and why of a question are projected one upon the other so as to consider possible contingencies, then when conceptually discussing a law of natural science it is also a tendency to mix the theoretical tenets which had led to the formulation of the law, and of what is categorically true, to that law in the sense of causality.  This does not mean that a theory becomes a law, indeed, even though the theory and the law are inseparable; the theory proves the law.  A scientific law allows a description which is as unfailingly accurate and as likely as can be, so that significant determinations can be accomplished as to 'what is' from a categorical basis, since the causality is so well-known and proven.  We tend to deem a well-known cause to be a law; Newton's Law of Gravitation says that objects fall at a certain rate of acceleration, but does it say why?  When working with such mathematical formulations as are found in the application of a scientific law, it is best to know why such formulations are so and correct; this does not mean that the theory behind the observation of 'what is' as according to a law has actually become that law, rather, the theory is the causal aspect of the existential nature of that which it explores and explains.  To say that the cause is the same as the description makes no sense, although in ferreting out the nature of 'what is' the cause becomes the all of the endeavor to discover exactly 'what is.'  This traces the tendency to equate theory and law terminologically at times.

In discussing the nature of the distinction between scientific theory and scientific law the development of the broader theoretical import which is associated with a law also carries oftentimes hypothetical instances and contingencies at the borders, at the limits of given parameters in the law, where such a law becomes less true in specific instances.  Once again, the hypothetical regard for the question of 'what is' will be invoked in the face of a law which no longer works to match the empirical solution to descriptive accuracy in a domain which may lie beyond the domain wherein the law had once been derived and/or discovered.  Such progression back to the theoretical treatment of the same reality which had once been embraced by a given law, but which no longer holds in all considerations or limits, marks the progression of scientific understanding.  This is how a body of knowledge grows scientifically.  It is as if the reality being explored and described as to 'what is' is met repeatedly by perception of deeper layers of the same reality when the causal aspect, the theory which explains the new limits of the same law, sets new precedent.  Consider, therefore, the exact power of a law of science.  A law of science is as a light tower which holds its own up to the time that certain values which are derived from its general equation are found to vary so much from the able prediction of the law, that a new theory must explain why the law fails, why the light of that law no longer reaches into what was thought to be its domain.  At such time as a new layer of reality has been disposed for consideration, is it not true that a deeper understanding of the law now becomes possible from a theoretical viewpoint?  This deeper understanding of an existing law may also lead to the statement of a new law, and one which may allow a more elaborate description of the matters at hand.  

On the other hand,  a law may incorporate a stipulation of behavior which is simplified unto certain parameters by excluding the real nature of matter, for instance, since that real nature may not show significant effect in a certain practical range; the Ideal Gas Law is such an example, and which ignores the attractive forces of molecules one to the other in its consideration of the behavior of gases under varying conditions as according to temperature, pressure and volume.  

(May, 2006)  

²DE Ingber.  The mechanochemical basis of cell and tissue regulation.  MCB, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 53-68

"Mechanical stress-induced alterations in cell shape and structure are critical for control of many cell functions, including growth, motility, contraction, and mechanotransduction. These functional alterations are mediated through changes in the internal cytoskeleton (CSK), which is composed of an interconnected network of microfilaments, microtubules, and intermediate filaments that links the nucleus to surface adhesion receptors."

³Ning Wang^*, Keiji Naruse, Dimitrije Stamenovi, Jeffrey J. Fredberg^*, Srboljub M. Mijailovich^*, Iva Marija Toli-Nørrelykke^*, Thomas Polte^§, Robert Mannix^§, and Donald E. Ingber.  Mechanical behavior in living cells consistent with the tensegrity model.  PNAS | July 3, 2001 | vol. 98 | no. 14 | 7765-7770.  See: Archives of PNAS at: http://www.pnas.org/contents-by-date.0.shtml

⁴G E Plopper, H P McNamee, L E Dike, K Bojanowski, and D E Ingber.  Convergence of integrin and growth factor receptor signaling pathways within the focal adhesion complex.  Mol Biol Cell. 1995 October; 6(10): 1349–1365. [Pub Med]

(December 25, 2005)

(15) Eine jede Erfahrung, die wir machen, ein jeder Versuch, durch den wir sie wiederholen, ist eigentlich ein isolierter Teil unserer Erkenntnis; durch öftere Wiederholung bringen wir diese isolierte Kenntnis zur Gewißheit. Es können uns zwei Erfahrungen in demselben Fache bekannt werden, sie können nahe verwandt sein, aber noch näher verwandt scheinen, und gewöhnlich sind wir geneigt, sie für näher verwandt zu halten, als sie sind. Es ist dieses der Natur des Menschen gemäß, die Geschichte des menschlichen Verstandes zeigt uns tausend Beispiele, und ich habe an mir selbst bemerkt, daß ich diesen Fehler oft begehe.  (15)

 (15) Every record which we render, every experiment by means of which we repeat it, is actually an isolated part of our cognition; through repeat more often we bring this isolated knowledge unto certainty.  There can be two researches well-known to us in the same subject, they can be related closely, however, seem yet more closely related, and we are usually well-disposed to hold them as more related than they are.  This is according to the nature of man; the history of the human intellect reveals for us a thousand examples, and I have noticed in me myself, that I commit this mistake often. (15)

(July 28 & 29 & August 1, 2005; edited December 25, 2005)

  (15)  A research finding can of itself be valid, yet, until it is developed within the framework  of a bigger picture, the exact significance of such a finding will not even be well understood.  In this fifteenth passage Goethe explicates the meaning of the interrelationship of different findings on the same subject which may seem to be more closely related amongst one another than they actually are.  In fact, since an original experiment may produce valid results, and nonetheless remain, as Goethe puts it, "...an isolated part of our cognition," if the mere possibility of a close relationship to another's experiment presents itself, the tendency in some loss of objectivity due to the desire to end an isolated context of one's work may be to magnify the putative proximity of relationship of the two researchings beyond their true connection, their actual conditional connectedness.  Indeed, Goethe himself admits that he even often commits such a mistake.  The nature of scientific work is collective and communal. Entire bodies of knowledge depend on the work of others for their furtherance, since logically the necessity to build a more holistic framework for understanding and knowledge is present, and is part of the drive of scientific curiosity and discovery.  The example in the preceding paragraph of the  newer theory of mechanotransduction as a way to explain how morphology can seem to transcend direct genetic regulation is astounding; it stands out as a shining example of how a given realm of function in a biological consideration can be finally brought into question even despite the vast extent of the knowledge gained and reasserted through elaborate research, and as in genetics, an actual genomic breakthrough.  Now the determinant status of genetics which mediates the biochemical events of living cells, tissues, organs, systems and organisms, having been elaborately researched and held in a position of supremacy for its contribution to the understanding of the way living things work, is under scrutiny through the understanding of how a living cell or tissue may react to mechanical force.  Currently, there is a theory abroad, the theory of mechanotransduction, which maintains that cells grow when their shapes are changed in an event of deformation, as has been explicated in the previous passage; however, this entire field of research into the nature of mechanical impetus in directing the inner machinery of the cells, including the genetic determining power over the biochemical mediations which eventually mediate the new growth, will be developed in an inter-relational sense with the existing bodies of knowledge of genetics and biochemistry.  Anyone who is at this time embarking upon scientific research, and who seeks to more fully understand how certain results can interrelate to others, as Goethe states in this fifteenth passage, should follow the progress of results in the theory of mechanotransduction for how those results will expand the knowledge of cell biology.

Goethe took on the question of the nature of the growth of plants as a scientist.  From his work, Der Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu Erklären of 1790 an entire branch of plant science, that of plant morphology, has been formed.  In this work Goethe describes the transmutation of the leaf into several different plant parts culminating in his concept, "Alles ist Blatt," or 'everything is (from the) leaf.' After translating that work so as to countenance this thinker in his own language for the purpose of accuracy of his intended meaning, I was confronted with the hypothesis that somehow plant morphology would comprise a science whose particular level in the hierarchy of biological organization was baffling as to its connection to the undeniable force of the causal basis of genetic determination.  However, a most useful article on the essence and history of plant morphology by Donald R. Kaplan clarified for me how to view the plant sciences for their levels of organization first.⁴

Indeed, the principles of plant morphology concern themselves with how form at the whole plant and organ levels displays convergences in a phylogenetic sense, so that the genetic systematics are inverted in relation to the study of form.  Plant morphology gives weight to the power of evolution in form, however, not from homologies phylogenetically, as in systematics.  Rather, the study of analogous types of form and how they are connected evolutionarily are presented, so that even predictive truth can be had by the astute plant morphologist.

Nevertheless, in understanding the basic tenets of plant morphology my own familiarity with the genetics of organisms, and that at the molecular and cellular levels, caused me to enter into a quandary when I read the following statement by Kaplan in the article heretofore cited: 

"It has been demonstrated that the plant's morphology is an emergent property relative to its anatomy; i.e., the two levels of organization can be relatively independent and the anatomical level does not determine the morphological level." 

In translating Goethe's treatise on plant metamorphosis I saw that his observations and descriptions certainly support such an emergent basis for the morphogenesis of growing plants, and he gives in-depth descriptions of drastic transmutations.  Before relating the scientific material present in Der Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu Erklären into the contemporary era I contemplated how it could be that anatomical parts could be surrendered in their primacy to form itself.  How could morphogenesis be so critical to the plant as a whole that it would be capable of transforming anatomy, and that it would be capable of directing anatomical f